Battle of Caporetto
The Battle of Caporetto (also known as the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, the Battle of Kobarid or the Battle of Karfreit as it was known by the Central Powers), took place from 24 October to 19 November 1917, near the town of Kobarid (now in north-western Slovenia, then part of the Austrian Littoral), on the Austro-Italian front of World War I. The battle was named after the Italian name of the town (also known as Karfreit in German).
Austro-Hungarian forces, reinforced by German units, were able to break into the Italian front line and rout the Italian army, which had practically no mobile reserves. The battle was a demonstration of the effectiveness of the use of stormtroopers and the infiltration tactics developed in part by Oskar von Hutier. The use of poison gas by the Germans also played a key role in the collapse of the Italian Second Army.
- Prelude 1
- Battle 2
- Analysis 3.1
- Casualties 3.2
- Subsequent operations 3.3
- Legacy 4
- Notes 5
- References 6
- References 7
- Further reading 8
- External links 9
In August 1917 Paul von Hindenburg decided that to keep the Austro-Hungarians in the war, the Germans had to help them defeat the Italian army. Erich Ludendorff was opposed to this but was overruled. In September three experts from the Imperial General Staff, led by the chemist Otto Hahn, went to the Isonzo front to find a site suitable for a gas attack. They proposed attacking the quiet Caporetto sector, where a good road ran west through a mountain valley to the Venetian plain.
A new 14th Army was formed, with nine Austrian and six German divisions, commanded by Otto von Below. The Italians inadvertently helped by providing weather information over their radio.
Foul weather delayed the attack for two days but on 24 October there was no wind and the front was misted over. At 02:00, 894 metal tubes (Gaswurfminen) dug into a reverse slope, were triggered electrically to simultaneously fire canisters containing 600 ml of chlorine and phosgene gases, smothering the Italian trenches in the valley in a dense cloud of poison. Knowing that their gas masks could protect them only for two hours or less, the defenders fled for their lives, though 500–600 were still killed. Then the front was eerily quiet until 06:00 when all the Italian wire and trenches to be attacked were bombarded by mortars.
At 06:30, 2,200 guns opened fire, many targeting the valley road along which reserves were advancing to plug the gap. At 08:00 two large mines were detonated under strong points on the heights bordering the valley and the infantry attacked. Soon they penetrated the almost undefended Italian fortifications in the valley, breaching the defensive line of the Italian Second Army between the IV and XXVII Corps. To protect the attackers' flanks Alpine Troops infiltrated the strong points and batteries along the crests of the adjoining ridges, Mount Matajur and the Kolovrat Range, playing out their telephone lines as they advanced to maintain contact with their artillery. They made good use of the new German model 08/15 Maxim light machine gun, light trench mortars, mountain guns, flamethrowers and hand grenades.
The attackers in the valley marched almost unopposed along the excellent road toward Italy, some advanced 25 kilometres (16 mi) on the first day. The Italian army beat back the attackers on either side of the sector where the central column attacked but Below's successful central penetration threw the entire Italian army into disarray. Forces had to be moved along the Italian front in an attempt to stem von Below's breakout but this only weakened other points along the line and invited further attacks. At this point, the entire Italian position was threatened.
The Italian 2nd Army commander Luigi Capello was commanding while bedridden with fever. Realizing that his forces were ill-prepared for this attack and were being routed, Capello requested permission to withdraw back to the Tagliamento. He was overruled by Cadorna who believed that the Italian force could regroup and hold out. Finally, on 30 October, Cadorna ordered the majority of the Italian force to retreat to the other side of the Tagliamento. It took the Italians four full days to cross the river, and by this time the German and Austro-Hungarian armies were on their heels. By 2 November, a German division had established a bridgehead on the Tagliamento. About this time, however, the rapid success of the attack caught up with them. The German and Austro-Hungarian supply lines were stretched to breaking point and consequently they were unable to launch another attack to isolate a part of the Italian army against the Adriatic. Cadorna was able to retreat further, and by 10 November had established a position on the Piave River.
Even before the battle, Germany was struggling to feed and supply its armies in the field. Erwin Rommel, who, as a junior officer, won the Pour le Mérite for his exploits in the battle, often bemoaned the demands placed upon his "poorly fed troops". The Allied blockade of the German Empire, which the Kaiserliche Marine had been unable to break, was partly responsible for food shortages and widespread malnutrition in Germany and the Central Powers in general. When inadequate provisioning was combined with the gruelling night marches preceding the battle of Caporetto (Kobarid), a heavy toll was imposed on the German and Austro-Hungarian forces. Despite these logistical problems, the initial assault was extremely successful. However, as the area controlled by the combined Central Powers forces expanded, an already limited logistical capacity was overstrained. By the time the attack reached the Piave, the soldiers of the Central Powers were running low on supplies and were feeling the physical effects of exhaustion. As the Italians began to counter the pressure put on them by the Central Powers, the German forces lost momentum and were once again caught up in another round of attrition warfare.
The battle led to the conference at Rapallo and the creation of a Supreme War Council, with the aim of improving Allied military co-operation and developing a unified strategy. Luigi Cadorna was forced to resign after the defeat. The defeat alone was not the sole cause, but rather the greatest of an accumulation of failures, as perceived by the Italian Prime Minister, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. Throughout much of his command, including at Kobarid (Caporetto), Cadorna was known to have maintained poor relations with the other generals on his staff. By the start of the battle he had sacked 217 generals, 255 colonels and 355 battalion commanders. In addition, he was detested by his troops as being too harsh. He was replaced by Armando Diaz and Pietro Badoglio. He had already been directing the battle 20 miles behind before fleeing another 100 miles to Padua.
This led Allied governments to understand that fear alone could not adequately motivate a modern army. After the defeat at Caporetto, Italian propaganda offices were established, promising land and social justice to soldiers. Italy also accepted a more cautious military strategy from this point on. General Diaz concentrated his efforts on rebuilding his shattered forces while taking advantage of the national rejuvenation that had been spurred by invasion and defeat.
Italian losses were enormous: 10,000 were killed, 30,000 wounded and 265,000 were taken prisoner – morale was so low among the Italian troops, mainly due to Cadorna's harsh disciplinary regime, that most of these surrendered willingly. Furthermore, roughly 3,000 guns, 3,000 machine guns and 2,000 mortars were captured, along with an untold amount of stores and equipment.
Austro-Hungarian and German forces advanced more than 100 km (62 mi) in the direction of Venice, but they were not able to cross the Piave River. Although up to this point the Italians had been left to fight on their own, after Kobarid (Caporetto) they were reinforced by six French infantry divisions and five British infantry divisions as well as sizeable air contingents. However, these troops played no role in stemming the advancing Germans and Austro-Hungarians, because they were deployed on the Mincio River, some 97 kilometres (60 mi) behind the Piave, as the British and French strategists did not believe the Piave line could be held. The Piave served as a natural barrier where the Italians could establish a new defensive line, which was held during the subsequent Battle of the Piave River and later served as springboard for the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, where the Austro-Hungarian army was finally defeated after four days of stiff resistance.
After this battle, the term "Caporetto" gained a particular resonance in Italy. It is used to denote a terrible defeat – the failed General Strike of 1922 by the socialists was referred to by Mussolini as the "Caporetto of Italian Socialism". Many years after the war, Caporetto was still being used to destroy the credibility of the liberal state.
The Battle of Caporetto has been the subject of a number of books. The Swedish author F.J. Nordstedt (pseud. Christian Braw) wrote about the battle in his novel Caporetto. The bloody aftermath of Caporetto was vividly described by Ernest Hemingway in his novel A Farewell to Arms. Curzio Malaparte wrote an excoriation of the battle in his first book, Viva Caporetto, published in 1921. It was censored by the state and suppressed; it was finally published in 1980.
Today, a museum in the town of Kobarid is dedicated to the Isonzo Battles in general, and the Caporetto Battle in particular.
- Caporetto has been considered "the greatest defeat in Italian military history." Historian John R. Schindler noted, "By any standard, Twelfth Isonzo [Caporetto] and its aftermath represented an unprecedented catastrophe for Italian arms." The disaster "came as a shock" and "triggered a search for scapegoats," culminating a 1919 Italian military commission that investigated the causes of the debacle.
- Sullivan (1994), p. 60
- Schindler (2001), p. 263
- Tucker (2010), p. 433
- Cassar (1998), p. 232
- Taken from the rest of the army: 300,000 drifters and 50,000 deserters, overwhelmed by the routed first line but then were back. See also previous footnote and Rommel, Erwin (1995). Infantry Attacks. Greenhill Books. pp. 168–227.
- Seth, Ronald (1965). Caporetto: The Scapegoat Battle. Macdonald. p. 147
- Falls, Cyril (1966). Caporetto 1917. Weidenfeld & Nicholson. p. 25.
- Hahn, Otto (1970). My life. Herder and Herder. p. 127.
- Geoffrey Regan, More Military Blunders, page 161
- Stearns, Peter; Langer, William (2001). The Encyclopedia of World History (6th ed.). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 669.
- Haber, Leonard (1986). The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. Clarendon Press. p. 186.
- Dupuy & Dupuy (1970), p. 971
- Die Kriegführung im Sommer und Herbst 1917. Die Ereignisse außerhalb der Westfront bis November 1918. Der Weltkrieg: Militärischen Operationen zu Lande XIII (Die digitale landesbibliotek Oberösterreich ed.). Berlin: Mittler. 2012 .
- Gudmundsson, Bruce (1989). Stormtroop Tactics. Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918. Praeger.
- Macksey, Kenneth (1997). Rommel: Battles and Campaigns. Da Capo Press. pp. 16–21, 224.
- Simkins, Peter; Jukes, Geoffrey; Hickey, Michael (2003). The First World War. Osprey Publishing. p. 352.
- Townley, Edward (2002). Collier, Martin, ed. Mussolini and Italy. Heinemann. p. 16.
- Geoffrey Regan, More Military Blunders, page 160
- Morselli, Mario (2001). Caporetto, 1917: Victory Or Defeat?. Routledge. p. 133.
- Andreopoulos, George G. (1994). The Aftermath of Defeat: Societies, Armed Forces, and the Challenge of Recovery. Yale University Press.
- Cassar, George H. (1998). The Forgotten Front: The British Campaign in Italy 1917-18. A&C Black.
- Schindler, John R. (2001). Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War. Greenwood.
- Tucker, Spencer (2010). Battles That Changed History: An Encyclopedia of World Conflict. ABC-CLIO.
- Cavallaro, G. V. (2009). Futility Ending in Disaster: Diplomatic, Military, Aviation and Social Events in the First World War on the Austro-Italian Front 1917. Bloomington, IN: Xlibris.
- Connelly, O. (2002). On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dupuy, R. E.; Dupuy, T. N. (1970). The Encyclopaedia of Military History: From 3,500 BC to the Present. sbn 356-02998-0 (rev. ed.). London: Jane's.
- Morselli, M. (2001). Caporetto 1917: Victory or Defeat?. Military History and Policy (8). London: Frank Cass.
- Reuth, R. G. (2005). Rommel: The End of a Legend. London: Haus Books.
- Seth, Ronald (1965). Caporetto: The Scapegoat Battle. London: Macdonald.
- Walks of Peace in the Soea Region Foundation: The Battles of the Isonzo, 1915–17
- Pro Hereditate: The Isonzo Front
- (Italian) La Grande Guerra: Novant'anni fa la Battaglia di Caporetto
- The Battle of Caporetto, 1917